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ABSTRACT
In this thesis we discuss our research in incorporating Machine Learning into network attack automation. The key idea is to audit the traffic between the attacker and the target machine, then apply Decision Tree Learning methods on the audit data to generate a set of rules, and create a smart attacker that is guided by those rules and is capable of launching attack sequence according to the response from the target machine. By conducting experiments on Linux platform, we constructed a framework named Auto Red Team (ART ) that audits traffic, compose training data, and generate an smart attacker by feeding those training data into a Decision Learning Tree model. Experiments shows that the ART can realize an effective and accurate attack automation. Beside basic data analysis on the experiment data, we also apply a statistical method, Principle Component Analysis on the experiment data to verify the generated rules. Although the Principle Component Analysis can not completely explain the rules by the Decision Tree module, some convincing explanations on the relationship between those rules and certain Principal Components were given.
CHAPTER 1. Introduction
In this chapter, we first describe the current state of attack automation and existing problem. We then provide our approach with emphasis of its contributions. Finally we give the roadmap of this thesis.
Problem Statement
The number of potential targets for attacks against computer network is soaring because of the increasing network scale, more and more diverse network user population, the evolution of the information technologies, and other factors. These factors adversely impact the efficiency of current network security systems. On the other hand, the threat of attack increases with sophisticated technologies that can obfuscate the nature of attack, and make the attack more dynamic and polymorphic. Thus, researches in new protection model against the increasing attack threat is becoming extremely important.
Among other protection technologies, proactive and offensive approaches can provide network security experts and system administrators with better help on identification of potential security holes in current network infrastructure. One of the proactive methods is Red Teaming, an approach that deploys network security experts to play attackers, showing how a real attacker would exploit the system's vulnerability. With Red Teaming's help, the system can be more effectively protected against the exploits from both script kiddies and sophisticated hackers.
Government agencies and institutions have already benefited from the application of Red knowledge about the attacks, should be able to play single attack or a set of attacks consisting of multiple types of exploits, and should be able to dynamically change its attack strategy according to the response from the target system, which requires the automatic attacker to be capable of learning from attacks. To our best knowledge, there is no such a robot acting like a smart attacker to play exploits against the network systems.
Our Approach
To address the above problem, we propose a design idea and implementation detail of a software, Automatic Red Team (ART ) that is an attack automation framework based on decision tree learning. By launching attacks selected from an attack database, sniffing traffic between attacker and target, composing training data, and generating new attacking strategy through a decision tree module, the ART platform achieves attack automation with less human supervision.
However, the intention of the ART framework is not to totally replace the network security experts. On the contrary, we do not believe that the security assurance task would become a fully automatic, plug-n-play job, at least in the near future. The main purpose of the ART framework is to assist network security professionals in assessing the vulnerability of network systems by taking over some simple and replicable penetration tasks.
The key contributions of our research works are listed as below:
Artificial Intelligence The ART incorporates a Machine Learning technology, C4.5 Decision Tree, making the ART a smarter attack platform than others without Artificial
Intelligence technologies.
Polymorphic Attacks Based on an attack database and guided by attack strategies, the ART can launch multiple types attacks against the target in an attack scenario. The attack database can be updated to keep up with the development of attack technologies.
Portability among Platforms
The inter-dependencies among attacker, attack database and the Decision Tree module are minimized. By playing plain-vanilla attack, the attacker does not need to know the details of the individual exploit program, so that the switch or upgrade the attack database would not have impact on the attacker, and vice versa.
The Decision Tree module receives the standardized training data from a Training Data Generator, and the generated rules by the module will be incorporated into a new attacker by an Attack Strategy Composer. Thus, there is no direct connection between the attack database and the attacker, minimizing the dependency between them. Thus, migration or upgrade of the ART framework becomes less stressful.
By building such a software, we made a meaningful attempt towards the attack automation that would benefit the improvement of cyber space security. We believe that our approach is a useful tool to be able to alleviate the network security professionals' work loads during Red Teaming.
Thesis Outline
The rest of the thesis is organized as the following: Chapter 2 reviews the related works:
1) attack simulation and modeling; 2) the application of machine learning in network security, especially for intrusion detection; 3) the application of statistical methods in network security.
Chapter 3 provides the design and implementation detail of the ART platform, and Chapter 4 presentes a case study on the ART framework: 1) describing the experiment environment and procedure; 2) analyzing the experiment result; 3) verifying the generated attack strategy with a statistical method, Principle Component Analysis. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes our work and give a discuss of the future work.
CHAPTER 2. Review of Related Works
In this chapter, we reviewed the related works on Attack Automation, the application of Decision Learning Tree in network security such as Intrusion Detection, and the application of statistic models such as Principle Component Analysis. 
Attack Modeling and Simulation
Application of Machine Learning and Statistical Method in Network Security
Machine Learning is able to understand the difference between normal and anomalous patterns by being trained with training data, and generate classifiers. These classfiers can be used to detect network attacks. Therefore, there are numerous efforts on applying Machine
Learning on security, especially anomaly detection. CHAPTER 3. Design and Implementation of the ART Framework
Introduction
In this chapter, we describe the design and implementation of the Auto Red Team (ART ), an attack automation framework based on Decision Learning Tree. We start from the enumeration of the design goal, subsequently the basic concept of the traffic sniffing, training data composing, and attacking strategy generating through Decision Tree Learning. Then we detail on the Design and implementation of the sub-modules of the framework. Finally, we discuss the efficiency and accuracy of this framework, and issues such as porting this software to other platforms.
Design Goal
The ART framework should should meet the following criteria.
Launch multiple round of attacks The ART framework should have a attack program library so that multiple attacks can be selected and launched against the targets. The framework should be able to maintain and update the current attack program library to keep up with the the quick evolving attack in real world.
Self training ability The framework should be capable of training itself by incorporating certain Artificial Intelligence approach so that it can generate corresponding Attack Strategy for different type of targets.
Differentiate between success and failure of the attack result The ART framework should be able to tell whether the attack is successfully complete or failed by analyzing the data generated from the traffic between the attack program and the target. Since the attacker plays the vanilla attack, the attacker has no knowledge about the attack program. So the attacker must rely on the traffic between the attack program and the target to make decisions.
Choose next step based on the response from target The ART framework must be capable of making choice of next steps from one of the followings: stop attacking if the last attack succeeds, or change to other type attack because the target seems to be immune on the current types of attack, or stay in the same type of attack but change a different attack program.
According to the goals, the ART framework should be able to sniffer traffic between attacker and targets, compose training data based on the captured traffic data, generate / update the attack strategies by feeding those training data into a Decision Learning Tree model, and apply these strategies onto the attacker.
Infrastructure of the ART framework
The ART framework consists of three major parts, attack program library, attacker trainer, and attacker. There are two modes of the ART -Training Mode and Attack Mode. In Training Mode, the framework launches multiple attacks to the target, and generate training data from the captured packets between the attacker and the target. These training data will be fed into a Decision Learning Tree module to generate a set of attack rules named Attack Strategy. In Attack Mode, the attacker incorporates the generated Attack Strategy and launches "smart" exploits according to the target response and the Attack Strategy until the exploit succeeds or all exploits fail. Figure 3 .1 shows the infrastructure of the ART . The detailed description of the sub-models is listed below.
Attack Database The Attack Database stores all the attack programs that are used against the targets. Instead of re-inventing the wheel, and also for concept-prove purpose, we choose the exploit library of Metasploit [Metasploit (2008) ] as the attack database of the Target The Target is a computer that is subject to be attacked by Attacker. Currently we use a PC with Windows XP Professional SP2 as the Target.
Packet Sniffer The Packet Sniffer audits the traffic between the Attacker and the Target, captures the all the packets, and pass the packets to the Packet-Preprocessor.
Packet Pre-processor The Packet-Preprocessor analyzes the packets and generates the statistic data of the exploit such as total packet of an exploit, average packet length, exploit duration, TCP flags and other statistic data. During the attack, these statistic data are updated by newly captured packets.
Training Data Generator The Training Data Generator only works under the Training
Mode. The Training Data Generator processes the Packet Pre-processor's data collection at the end of every exploit, and combined all the data into a single line of training data.
It also asks for the human being's conclusion on the result of the exploit: Succeed, or There is a loop in the ART framework: the Attacker launches attacks according to the current Attack Strategy; the packets between the Attacker and target will be used to generate new Attack Strategy by the Decision Learning Tree Module; The newly generated Attack Strategy will be incorporated into the Attacker to make a smarter Attacker, and so on.
implementation of the ART framework
In this section, we will discuss the implementation detail of the ART framework. We start with the Attacker and Attack Database, we then describe the core part, Packet Processor including Packet Sniffer, Packet Pre-processor, and Training Data Generator. Finally, we will introduce how the Attack Strategy Composer transforms the output from Decision Learning
Tree to Perl version if-else statements.
Implementation of Attack Database and Attacker
We chose the exploit library of Metasploit version 3.1 [Metasploit (2008) ] as the attack database of the ART . The Metasploit, a popular development platform for development of security tools, is used by many network security professionals to perform penetration tests, to verify security patches, and to perform regression tests. The framework is developed in Ruby programming language. Some of its components are also written in C or assembler.
The Metasploit provides large exploit database for various Operating Systems including in others, Microsoft Windows series, Linux, Mac OSX and various Unix systems. Currently, we only use its exploits for Windows as our concept-prove implementation. All the Windows exploit categories are listed in Table 3 .1.
The Metasploit also provides both GUI and CLI. We chose a CLI command as the interface between the Metasploit and the Attacker. The command is msfcli with syntax as ./msfcli <exploit name> <option=value> [mode] . command line query interface, we hard-coded the name of the exploits into Attacker so that it can launch these exploits by calling the msfcli with the correspondent exploit name. The procedure of launching an exploit is listed below:
1. Select an exploit according to its Attack Strategy;
2. Create a pipe;
3. Fork a process to execute the selected exploit by calling msfcli; 
Implementation of Packet Processor
The Packet Processor consists of three sub models -Packet Sniffer, Packet Pre-processor, and Training Data Generator, which work together to accomplish tasks of traffic audit and training data composition. We detail on the implementation in the following. Packet Pre-processor Layer by layer, the Packet Pre-processor breaks down every packet that is forwarded from Packet Sniffer, starting from Link layer, IP layer, to TCP/UDP layer. During the break down, the Packet Pre-processor profiles the packet length in IP layer, the TCP flags, Source and Destination Port, and updates the statistic data starting from the begin of exploit -packet counts, total packet size, average packet size, maximum packet size, minimum packet size, standard deviation of packet size, current interval, total duration, average interval, maximum interval, minimum interval, and standard deviation of the packet interval.
Packet Sniffer
Training Data Generator The Training Data Generator is blocked by function wait(the process id of the Attacker). Upon the completion of the exploit, the Attacker process exits, unblocking the Training Data Generator that will extract the statistic data from Packet Pre-processor and the exploit conclusion from user. After consolidating all the data and conclusion into a single line item, the Training Data Generator re-launches an Attacker to profile a new training data item by forking a new process. However, if the Training Data Generator receives a "start-to-train" command from user, it will feed all the saved training data into the Decision Learning Tree by forking a new process that will run the Decision Learning Tree Module.
Implementation of the Decision Learning Tree and Attack Strategy Composer
The modified C4.5 Decision Learning Tree software is originally written by J.R. Quinlan (1992) . The original release is written for BSD 4.3. To port this release onto Linux platform, we made some changes. For example, we changed function pair calloc and cfree to malloc and free.
Since the Decision Learning Tree module can not generate output that can be directly incorporated into a program, we need to to change the module's output from human readable rules to certain if -then statements that can be incorporated into some executable script such 
Discussion
In this chapter, we described the design goals, software infrastructure of ART framework, and the implementation details. The framework is an attack automation platform incorporating existing softwares such as Metasploit and C4.5 Decision Learning Tree module. The ART framework has the following hightlights:
Minimum Dependency between Exploits and the Platform By playing "Plain-Valinlla" exploit against the various targets, the ART can easily be expanded and upgraded because the dependency between the exploit and the platform is reduced to the minimum.
Therefore, the ART can switch to another Attack Database from the Metasploit, the currently used Attack Database, if needed.
Artificial Intelligence The ART incorporates one of the popular Machine Learning methods, C4.5 Decision Learning Tree module, making the ART a smarter attack platform than others without Artificial Intelligence technologies. According to the experiment in next chapter, the accuracy of the decision tree based attacker can be as high as 90.5%.
CHAPTER 4. Experiment: Using Exploits on Windows to Train an Attacker
To verify the ART framework, we conducted an experiment that generated 42 training data by launching exploits against a Windows XP machine. We then fed these data into a 
Experimental Environment
The experiment settings and the experiment procedure are listed below: Training Data There are 13 metrics in a single training data. These metrics and their description are shown Table 4 .1 As seen in Figure 4 .1, the C4.5 Decision Learning Tree module produced a five-level decision tree. The root of the generated tree is total packet size followed by TCP flags, total duration and etc. The error rate of the decision tree is 9.5%. The rules generated of the C4.5 Decision Learning Tree module also generated four rules regarding to how to conclude the exploit result.
The error rate of the examination on these rules are 23.8%. Besides, we also have the following observations:
• As seen in Figure 4 .4, the exploits that have total packet size greater than 11,000 are all failed exploits. So it is not surprised to see that the C4.5 Decision Learning Tree module treats the exploit with larger total packet size as first criteria of fail or succeed.
• The "R" in TCP flags stands for a reset signal from target machine, which means that the exploited port is closed. An exploit attacking an closed port will not succeed in most cases. So it is not surprised that all decisions on the flags with "R" are classified as failed attempt.
Statisitical Analysis
Introduction of Principle Component Analysis
The training data can be treated as a matrix with 42 row and 13 columns. Each row represents an exploit and each column represents a metric of the exploit, such as total packets or ave interval shown in Table 4 .1. The 42 × 13 matrix makes it difficult to understand the relationship between the training data and the generated tree. To tackle such a problem, we apply a multivariate statistical method, Principle Component Analysis on the training data to verify the generated rules. Before Pruning After Pruning training data matrix can be transferred into a less dimension data space.
The original n × p data matrix can be seen as a set of observable random vectors X p×1
with mean µ and covariance matrix Σ. Each vector, X can be written in linear combinations shown in Equation 4.1. 
Applying Principle Component Analysis on the Training Dta
We wrote a script of R language [R Project (2008) Tree also incorporated the flag in its every generated rule. However, why there is no rule to incorporate the ave interval that also has positive value needs more study.
• According to Figure 4 .7, V11: max interval and V13: std dev interval take opposite variation direction against the V1: flag. On the other hand, the C4.5 Decision Learning
Tree also put the max interval into the third level of the generated tree (See Our observation suggests that: somehow, the generated tree and rules reflects the major variation of the Original training data. However, the Decision Learning Tree algorithm is a nonlinear system. So the linear Principle Component Analysis should not be able to completely explain the output from the C4.5 Decision Tree.
Discussion
In this chapter, we presented the experiment result including the generated decision tree and the rules that will be incorporated into the Attacker as the new Attack Strategy. To further investigate the relationship between the generated decision tree and the metrics, we applied However, this experiment only use a Windows XP machine as target machine, not reflecting the diversity of the targets in real world. Our next step is to use the Attacker against other Operating Systems to get as diverse as possible training data.
CHAPTER 5. Summary and Discussion
In this chapter, we summarize the thesis, review the thesis contributions, and discuss the future work.
Summary
This thesis describes a framework named ART , standing for Auto Red Team, which is a platform utilizing Decision Tree Learning technology to realize attack automation. The key idea is to audit the traffic between the attacker and the target machine, then apply Decision Tree Learning methods on the audit data to generate a set of rules, then incorporate these rules into the attacker, making it be capable of launching attack sequence according to the response from the target machine.
We were motivated by stating the importance of attack automation on Red Teaming that can alleviate security experts and system administrators' burden by taking over certain redundant tasks in penetration test. We provide the background of Red Teaming and attack automation and point out that current Red Teaming softwares can only perform simple attack automation and lack of adaptability, and extensibility. We then proposed our idea to incorporating Decision Tree Learning techniques in order to build a smarter framework. The goal of this thesis is therefore to develop such a software that is adaptive and extensive in penetration test automation.
We then reviewed the current research works in Attack Automation, the application of Decision Learning Tree in network security such as Intrusion Detection, and the application of statistic models such as Principle Component Analysis of Cluster Analysis. After that, we present the design and implementation details of our platform, ART framework. We also presented our case study of the ART by conducting experiments on it, showing that the ART is able to perform traffic auditing, to extract new attack rules, named Attack Strategy that are generated from a Decision Tree Learning module, and to make new attacker that is guided by those Attack Strategy and is capable of launching attack sequence according to the response from the target machine. Beside basic data analysis on the experiment data, we also apply a statistical method, Principle Component Analysis on the experiment data to verify the generated rules. Although the Principle Component Analysis can not completely explain the rules generated by the Decision Tree module, some convincing explanations on the relationship between those rules and Principal Components were given.
Thesis Contributions
The intention of the ART framework is not to totally replace the network security experts.
On the contrary, we do not believe that the security assurance task would become a fully automatic, plug-n-play job, at least in the near future. The main purpose of the ART framework is to assist network security professionals in assessing the vulnerability of network systems by taking over some simple and replicable penetration tasks.
Portability among Platforms The inter-dependencies among attacker, attack database and the Decision Tree module are minimized. By playing plain-vanilla attack, the attacker does not need to know the details of the individual exploit program, so that the switch or upgrade the attack database would not have impact on the attacker, and vice versa. The Decision Tree module receives the standardized training data from a Training Data Generator, and the generated rules by the module will be incorporated into a new attacker by a Attack Strategy Composer. Thus, there is no direct connection between the attack database and the attacker, minimizing the dependency between them. Consequently, migration or upgrade of the ART framework becomes less stressful.
Future Work
There are two interesting and important future directions:
Generating Rules based on Hybrid Data : Currently the Attack Strategy is generated from the training data on single type of Operating System. We believe that it would make the Attack Strategy more robust if we could conduct experiments on various Operating System and collect training data from those experiments. 
Incorporating Complier Techniques
Closing Remarks
This thesis documented our research in developing and applying Decision Tree Learning techniques to the challenging problem of attack automation applications. A framework named ART that is for such an application was designed, implemented, and evaluated for this thesis research. While ART has shown great promises, there are still open issues for future research.
APPENDIX:
The 
